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Abstract
The theory of granular partitions is designed to capture in a formal framework
important aspects of the selective character of common-sense views of reality. It
comprehends not merely the ways in which we can view reality by conceiving its
objects as gathered together not merely into sets, but also into wholes of various
kinds, partitioned into parts at various levels of granularity. We here represent
granular partitions as triples consisting of a rooted tree structure as first compo-
nent, a domain satisfying the axioms of Extensional Mereology as second com-
ponent, and a mapping (called ’projection’) of the first into the second as a third
component. We define ordering relations among granular partitions the resulting
structures are called partition frames. We then introduce an axiomatic theory which
sentences are interpreted in partition frames.
1 Introduction
Human beings have a variety of ways of dividing up, classifying, mapping, sorting
and listing the objects in reality. The theory of granular partitions presented in [BS03,
SB02] seeks to provide a general and unified basis for understanding such phenom-
ena in formal terms. Its aim is to contribute to an understanding of the granular
and selective character of human common sense. Related work in this area includes
[Hob85, BWJ98, Ste, Ste00, Don01, Bit02].
The theory of granular partitions has two parts. The first is a theory of classification
(Theory A), which describes the tree structures of familiar classificatory systems. The
second is a theory of reference or intentionality (Theory B). It provides an account of
how those tree-structures relate to objects in reality.
Consider, for example, the Figure 1. On the left side we have a simple tree repre-
sentation of the (incomplete) subdivision of the categoryf od into subcategoriesfruit
andvegetables. Theory A governs how to build nestedcell structuresin such a way
that they correspond to the mentioned category trees. In the middle of Figure 1 such
a cell structure is represented as a Venn diagram. Theory B governs the way these
cell-structures project onto reality indicated by the arrows connecting the middle and
the right parts of the Figure.
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Figure 1: Relationships between cells and objects
Bittner and Smith use the notion of projection to characterize the relation between
the cells in a partition and objects in reality. Briefly, we can think of cells as being
projected onto objects in something like the way in which floodlights are projected
upon objects on the stage in a theater. Projection is involved also when proper names
are used to refer to the objects they denote or when acts of perception are directed
towards objects in the immediate environment of the perceiving subject. (Projection
is thus close to what philosophers call ‘intentionality’ [Ser83].) In 1 the cell labeled
‘Vegetables’ projects onto the class of all vegetables in reality.
Granular partitions are not only at work in the realm of classes of things such as
food, vegetables, etc., but also in the realm of objects. Consider Figure 2. On the left
side we have the tree representation of certain aspects of the mereological structure of
the human being Fred. In the middle we have a corresponding cell structure and at the
right hand side we have the target domain – your friend Fred. We assume the obvious
‘Fred’s Head’ 7→ Fred’s head, ‘Fred’s limbs’ 7→ Fred’s left arm + Fred’s right arm +






Figure 2: Relationships between cells and objects (2)
All granular partitions are both selective and granular. Selectivity of projection
means that a partition does not project onto all objects. Consider Figure 2. Granularity
of projection means more specifically that a partition projects onto a whole without
projecting onto all of its parts. The depicted partition of Fred is granular since there is
a cell projecting onto Fred’s head but there are no cells projecting onto parts of Fred’s
head such as his nose, his ears, etc., and similarly for all other cells which do not have
subcells.
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In order to see what selectivity means, consider the cell structure in the middle of
Figure 2. Here we have only the subcells ‘Head’ and ‘Limbs’. There is no cell ‘Torso’
in this cell structure. This may be because this cell tree is a part of a partition which
deals only with parts of Fred that ‘stick out of the torso’. In this case, the partition
selectively projects only on parts which are relevant given the purpose for which the
partition was created.
F’s Head
F’s left leg F’s right legF’s left arm F’s right arm
F’s l. hand F’s l. upper arm F’s l. lower arm
Freds body
F’s Torso F’s Limbs
Figure 3: Relationships between cells and objects (3)
In their paper [BS03], Bittner and Smith focus on single granular partitions and
their projective relation to reality. In the present paper, we will talk about the relations
between granular partitions, and we will define structures on sets of granular partitions.
Consider Figures 2 and 3. The granular partitions in both figures project onto Fred, but
the partition in Figure 3 includes more detail than the partition in Figure 2. In this paper,
we will define arefinementrelation on partitions, according to which the partition in
Figure 3 is a refinement of the partition in Figure 2.
To better understand these kinds of relations among granular partitions, we will
introduce a class of structures calledlabeled typed granular partitionsand define an
ordering on these structures. We will show that these structures formframe structures
in the sense of [HC04], which will then provide the formal semantics for our partition
logic L. This logic is a predicate modal logic of type S4. We show that reasoning
in L is sound with respect to our partition theoretic semantics and we claim that rea-
soning withinL has many properties of commonsense reasoning due to its underlying
partition-theoretic semantics.
2 Individual objects, cell trees, and types of objects
We begin by presenting the two mereological systems that are needed for the definition
of typed granular partitions.
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The primitive relation of mereology is the part-of relation. This binary relation is
reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive, i.e., it is a partial ordering relation. As pointed
out by authors such as [WCH87, GP95, AFG96], there are different kinds of parthood
relations, which can be further classified by additional axioms. In this paper two kinds
of parthood relations are of relevance:
1. The parthood relation characterized by the axiomatic system of extensional mere-
ology (EM) [Sim87, CV99]. We will use the symbol≤ for this relation. We call
the entities among which this parthood relation holdsobjects. (That is, objects
are the members of the domain of EM.) ‘Object’ here is used in a very wide
sense, to include also scattered mereological sums. We will use the lettersx, x1,
x2, y, y1, y2, etc. as variables for objects.
2. The parthood relation characterized by what we call rooted tree mereology (RTM).
We will use the symbolv for this relation. We call the entities among which this
parthood relation holdscells. (That is, cells are the members of the domain of
RTM.) We will use the lettersz, z1, z2, etc. as variables for cells.
To specify the axioms for EM and RTM, we need to introduce an additional mere-
ological relation. We say thatx1 andx2 overlapif and only if there is somex that is
a part of bothx1 andx2. We will use the same symbolO for overlap in both EM and
RTM the kinds of variables (variables for objects or variables for cells) will make clear
which relation is meant. The formal definitions of the overlap relation in EM and RTM
can be stated as follows.
DO-EM x1Ox2 ≡ (∃x)(x ≤ x1 ∧ x ≤ x2)
O-RTM z1Oz2 ≡ (∃z)(z v z1 ∧ z v z2)
In EM, there is one additional axioms besides those requiring≤ to be a partial
ordering (i.e., reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive) [Sim87]: the axiom of exten-
sionality, which tells us that if every object that overlaps x also overlaps y, then x is a
part of y:
AE-GM ∀x(xOx1 → xOx2) → x1 ≤ x2
Note that it follows from AE-EM and the anti-symmetry of≤ thatO is extensional in
EM.
TE-EM ∀x(xOx1 ↔ xOx2) → x1 = x2
Structures which satisfy the axioms of rooted tree mereology (RTM) form rooted
trees similar to the one depicted in the left part of Figure 3. The rooted tree structure is
ensured by the axioms below, which are added to the axioms requiringv to be a partial
ordering.
We use the following definition in the axioms.
DI-RTM z1vz2 ≡ z1 v z2 ∧ ∀z(z1 v z v z2 → z = z1 ∨ z = z2)
Whenz1vz2, we say thatz1 is animmediate subcellof z2.
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We now give the following axioms for the partial orderingv:
ARoot-RTM (∃z)(∀z1)z1 v z
ARoot-RTM requires that each model,Z of RTM have a maximal cell. It follows from
the anti-symmetry ofv that this maximal cell is unique. We will letroot(Z) stand for
the unique maximal cell of the cell treeZ.
AChain-RTM each cellz ∈ Z there is a finite chainzvz1v . . . znvroot(Z)
of immediate subcells connecting z toroot(Z);
AO-RTM z1Oz2 → z1 v z2 ∨ z2 v z1
AO-RTM restricts overlap to cells that stand in the subcell relation. Thus, there are no
instances of proper overlap in RTM models. Notice that it follows from AO-RTM and
the anti-symmetry ofv that the graph induced byv contains no circles, i.e. is a tree.
AO-RTM is also called the no-partial-overlap principle.
Finally, to do justice to the fact that cells and partitions are cognitive artifacts
[Smi04], we add the following axiom.
AFin-RTM There are only finitely many cells in any model of RTM.
EM is designed to capture mereological reality: ifx is part of y, then the EM
representation of the part-whole structure ofy must do justice to this fact. RTM, in
contrast, is designed to capture the selectivity of cognition: RTM is a mereology, in
which not all parts need be represented; in particular, RTM is devised in such a way
that we can do justice to the granularity of cognition: when we see paint on a wall, we
do not see the molecules by which this paint is constituted. Thus models of RTM need
not satisfy the axiom of extensionality. The axiom of extensionality will fail in trees
that include a cell,x, which has exactly one immediate proper subcell,y. In this case,x
andy will be distinct even though they overlap exactly the same cells. We allow these
kinds of models because we want our cell trees to be able to represent the selectivity
of human cognition. For example, in a partition representing the parts of a particular
yacht, called ’Maude’, the cell representing the whole boat may have only one proper
subcell representing, Maude’s engine, because in a particular context we may only be
interested in Maude’s engine parts. And it is unlikely that there will ever be a partitition
projecting onto Maude which includes cells projecting onto the separate molecules in
these engine parts.
We use the variablese, e1, e2, . . . to range over types (or classes) – (the typehuman
being, the typenational state, the type mountain, and so forth). The relation of instan-
tiation holds between objects and their types (in that order). For example New York
City is an instance of the typecity, I am an instance of the typehuman being. We write
Instxe to signify that the objectx instantiates the typec.
The relationInst is irreflexive and asymmetric. Since in our ontology types and
objects are represented as disjoint sorts of variables we do not need to add explicit
irreflexivity and asymmetry axioms forInst. We require every object is member of
some type (AI1); every type has some object as its member (AI2); ifx is instance ofe1
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if and only if x is an instance ofe2 thene1 ande2 are identical (AI3).
AI1 (∃e)(Instxe)
AI2 (∃x)(Instxe)
AI3 (x)(Instxe1 ↔ Instxe2) → e1 = e2
We define the sub-type relation in terms of instantiation:e1 is a sub-type ofe2 if and
only if the instances ofe1 are also instances ofe2. For example, the type (class) federal
state is a sub-type of the type socio-economic unit. Therefore every instance of federal
state (e.g., New York State) is also an instance of socio-economic unit.
D⊆ e1 ⊆ e2 ≡ (x)(Instxe1 → Instxe2)
We can prove that⊆ is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. We call the theory
formed byAI1-3 Minimal Type Theory (MTT).
3 Typed and labeled granular partitions
In this section, we first define a mathematical framework for the theory of granular
partitions following the strategy outlined in [BS03]. We then extend this framework in
two directions: Firstly, we require that cells of granular partitions are alwayslabeled.
The label of a cell is the name of the object onto which the cell projects. Secondly, we
require that cells of granular partitions have alwaysn associated type. If a given cell
z projects on an object of a given typee, thene is the associated type of the projecting
cell z.
3.1 Granular partitions
We introduce the notationEM andRTM to denote the classes of structures satisfying
EM and RTM. We now definegranular partitionsx as triples of the form
(Z,∆, ρ)
whereZ ∈ RTM is called thecell treeof the partition,∆ ∈ EM is called thetarget
domainof the partition, and theprojection-mappingof signatureρ : Z → ∆ has the
following properties:
(i) ρ is a one-one mapping, i.e., ifρ(z1) = ρ(z2) thenz1 = z2;
(ii) ρ is order-preservingin the sense that ifz1 v z2 thenρ(z1) ≤ ρ(z2). This
ensures that the tree structure inZ does not distort the mereological structure in
∆;
(iii) ρ is not an empty mapping:(∃z)(∃x)(ρ(z) = x). It follows that every granular
partition has at least one cell in its cell tree and at least one object in its target
domain ;
(iv) ρ is a total mapping. This equivalent to requiring that granular partitions do not
contain empty cells in the sense of [BS03].
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In general theρ will be not an onto mapping due to the selective and granular character
of granular partitions.
3.2 Labeling
Consider the tree structures in Figure 2 and the way the corresponding cell trees project
onto the objectFred. Thelabelson the nodes of the tree and the cells are an important
aspect of the representations of Fred’s parts. We will interpret the labels of granular
partitions asnamesof the entities the labeled cell projects on. Notice that the label
’Fred’s left leg’ is not understood as a definite description [Rus19], i.e., the unique
instance of the type (class, kind)left human legthat is part of Fred at a given time. This
leg keeps its name during its existence. If Fred donates his left leg and the leg becomes
a part of Bill then the name the name of Bill’s new leg is still ’Fred’s left leg’.
Let Λ be the set of names in languageλ and let(Z,∆, ρ) be a granular partition. A
labeled granular partitionis then a quintuple of the form
(Z,∆, ρ,Λ, φ),
which is such that the labeling functionφ : Λ → Z is a one-one and onto mapping, i.e.
each cell in the treeZ has a unique label. It follows that ifλi ∈ Λ is a label for a cell,
then there is an entity inx ∈ ∆ such thatλi is the name ofx. Names are finite strings
of some alphabetλ. Since a cell tree has finitely many cells, it is always possible to
assign finite strings ofλ to the cells of a given partition. The labeling mappingsφ will
in general be partial, since finite partitions do not exhaust all strings of the underlying
alphabet.
Consider the left part of Figure 4. The corresponding labeled granular partition
(Z,∆, ρ, α, φ) has projection and labeling mappingsρ andφ which are such that the
following holds:
ρ = {(φ(‘Montana’),Montana), (φ(‘Idaho’), Idaho), (φ(‘Wyoming’),Wyoming), . . .}.
(1)
Hereφ(‘Montana’) stands for “the cell labeled ‘Montana”’ andMontanarefers to the
targeted portions of reality (in this case, the portion of the surface of Earth that is
occupied by the Federal State Montana).
Figure 4: (left) A labeled granular partition (some labels are omitted) ; (right) a miss-
labeled granular partition.
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Consider the right part of Figure 4. Here we have a ‘mislabeling’ of the form
ρ(φ(‘Idaho’)) = Montana, which means that the cell labeled ‘Idaho’ projects onto
the piece of land which is usually referred to as Montana. Intuitively, this means that
the labeling of this partition is in a certain way incompatible with the way the vast
majority of other partitions which target the same domain are labeled. In particular, it
is incompatible with the way the federal government of the United States labels their
maps (which are special kinds of partitions [BS01]).
3.3 Typed granular partitions
Let (Z,∆, ρ) be a granular partition and letΩ be a set of types which together with their
instances – objects inEM – satisfy the axioms of our Minimal Type Theory (MTT). A
typing for partition (Z,∆, ρ) is a mappingψ of signatureψ : Z → Ω assigning cells
in Z to members of the setΩ. If ψ(z) = c then we say that the cellz is of typec. A
typed granular partitionthen is a quintuple of the form
(Z,∆, ρ,Ω, ψ)
such that the typing functionψ has the following properties:
1. ψ is a total function, i.e., each cell in the treeZ has exactly one type but there
can be multiple cells inZ that have the same type,
2. if cell z is of type e and z projects ontox thenx is an instance ofe, i.e., if
ψ(z) = e thenInstρ(z)e.
Consider the left part of Figure 3. The corresponding typed granular partition(Z,∆, ρ,Ω, ψ)
has projection and typing mappingsρ andψ which are such that the following holds:
ψ = {(φ(‘Fred’s body’),human body), (φ(‘Fred’s head’),human heads),
(φ(‘Fred’s left leg’), left human leg), . . .}.
and
Inst = {(ρ(φ(‘Fred’s body’)),human body), (ρ(φ(‘Fred’s head’)),human heads),
(ρ(φ(‘Fred’s left leg’)), left human leg), . . .}.
(2)
A labeled and typed granular partitionthen is a seven-tuple of the form
(Z,∆, ρ,Λ, φ,Ω, ψ)
such that(Z,∆, ρ) is a granular partition,(Z,∆, ρ,Λ, φ) is a labeled granular partition,
and(Z,∆, ρ,Ω, ψ) is a typed granular partition.
4 Refinement relations between granular partitions
So far we have discussed single granular partitions and their projective relation to re-
ality. In this section we will discuss relations between granular partitions, and we
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will define structures on sets of granular partitions. As discussed above the granular
partitions in Figures 2 and 3 project onto Fred, but the partition in Figure 3 includes
more detail than the partition in Figure 2. This will now be captured formally in our
discussion ofrefinementrelation between labeled typed granular partitions.
4.1 Refinement as ordering
LetΠ be a set of labeled typed granular partitions. LetΓ1 = (Z1,∆1, ρ1,Λ1, φ1,Ω1, ψ1)
andΓ2 = (Z2,∆2, ρ2,Λ2, φ2,Ω2, ψ2) be labeled, typed granular partitions inΠ. And
let Γ1 andΓ2 be the labeled, typed granular partitions in Figures 2 and 3. One can
see thatΓ1 andΓ2 stand in a kind of refinement relation to each other. We will use
the symbol to refer to this relation and writeΓ1  Γ2 to express the fact that the
granular partitionΓ1 is a refined by the granular partitionΓ2.
We give a formal account of the relation as follows. For labeled typed granular
partitionsΓ1,Γ2 ∈ Π we say thatΓ1  Γ2 if and only if there exists a mapping
f : Z1 → Z2 with the following properties:
(i) f is one-one and total,
(ii) f is order-preserving, i.e., if zi v zj thenf(zi) v f(zj),
(iii) f is target-preserving, i.e.,ρ1(z) = ρ2(f(z)),
(iv) f is label-preserving, i.e.,φ2(λi) = f(φ1(λi)), and
(v) f is type-preserving, i.e.,ψ1(c) = ψ2(f(c)).
The existence of the mappingf with its particular properties (i-v) ensures that if par-
tition Γ1 is a refinement of partitionΓ2, then we can map cells inZ1 to cells inZ2
in such a way that: (a) if two cells inzi, zj ∈ Z1 are subcells of each other then so
are their counterparts inf(z1), f(z2) ∈ Z2; (b) the targetρ1(z) of the cellz ∈ Z1 is
identical to the targetρ2(f(z)) of its counterpartf(z) ∈ Z2; (c) the cellsz ∈ Z1 and
f(z) ∈ Z2 have the same labels; and (d) the cellsz ∈ Z1 andf(z) ∈ Z2 have the
same type. In other words we require that if partitionΓ1 is a refinement of partitionΓ2
then there exists an order-, label-, type-, and target-preserving mappingf such that the
diagrams in Figure 5 commute.
Let Γ,Γ1,Γ2 andΓ3 be a labeled, typed granular partitions. We can show that the
relation is reflexive (ref) and transitive (tr):
(ref) We haveΓ  Γ since the identity map of a cell tree onto itself, defined by
z = id(z) is always order-, label-, type-, and target-preserving.
(tr) For transitivity we have to show that iff1 : Z1 → Z2 andf2 : Z2 → Z3 are
order-, label-, type-, and target-preserving then so is their compositionf1 ◦ f2 :






























































Figure 6: Commutative diagram illustration fothe proof of transitivity of.
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4.2 Refinement vs. extension
Consider the left part of Figure 7. We have a partitionΓx with ∆x being the col-
lection of Fred’s body parts,Λx = {‘Fred’s body’, ‘Fred’s right arm’, . . .}, Ωx =
{human body, right human arm,upper human body, . . .}, cells labeled ‘Fred’s body’
and ‘Fred’s right arm’ withφ(‘Fred’s right arm’) v φ(‘Fred’s body’) and with the cell
labeled ‘Fred’s right arm’ projecting onto your friend Freds’ right arm, i.e.,ρx(φx(‘Fred’s right arm’)) =
Freds’ right arm, and the cell labeled ‘Fred’s body’ projecting onto Fred’s whole body,
i.e.,ρx(φx(‘Fred’s’ body’)) = Freds’ body. (In Figure 7 we use the stretched bracket
< to indicate that the cell labeled ‘Fred’s body’ targets Fred’s whole body.) The cell
labeled ‘Fred’s right arm’ is of typeright human armand the cell labeled ‘Fred’s body’
is of typehuman body.
We also have a partitionΓy with Λy = Λx, Ωy = Ωx, ∆x = ∆y, andφ(‘Fred’s right arm’) v
φ(‘Fred’s upper body’) v φ(‘Fred’s body’), with ‘Fred’s right arm’ and ‘Freds body’
being of the same type and projecting as above, and with ‘Fred’s upper body’ with the
obvious type and projection. (In the figure we use the small bracket< to indicate that
the cell labeled ‘Fred’s upper body’ targets Fred’s upper body.) It is easy to see that the





















Figure 7: Examples of partitions between the relation holds (1).
The situation in the right part of Figure 7 is similar. We haveΓx as before. However
we have a refinementΓz in with a third cell labeled ‘Fred’s right arm’ which is not a
supercell of ‘Fred’s left arm’ and in which projects onto Freds’ left arm. Again, the
induced mappingf2 : Zx → Zz is order-, target-, type-, and label-preserving. Thus
Γx  Γz.
In the left part of Figure 8, we have a refinement ofΓx by Γu similar to the re-
finement in the left part of Figure 7. The refinement partitionΓy andΓu recognize
the same parts of Fred: Fred as a whole, Freds upper body, and Freds right arm. They
differ however in the following respect: The partitionΓy recognizes the fact that Freds
right arm is a part of Freds upper body. This aspect of mereological ordering is traced
over in the partitionΓu.























Figure 8: Examples of partitions between the relation holds (2).
this consider the mappingf4 : Zu → Zy mapping cells inZu to cells with matching
labels inZy. Clearly,f4 is order-, target-, type-, and label-preserving, henceΓu  Γy.
On the other hand the partitionsΓy andΓz are not comparable with respect to since
no commutative diagram like the one in the left of Figure 5 can be constructed for the
two partitions.
The refinement relations in Figures 7 and 8 are examples of what we callproper
refinement. In proper refinement the object targeted by the root cell – the cell ‘Fred’s
body’ in Figures 7 and 8– remains the same. A proper refinement can target additional
objects as long as these objects are parts of objects targeted by the original partition
(e.g.,Γx  Γy in Figure 7). Or, a proper refinement may target the same set of objects
but include more information about mereological relations between objects (e.g.,Γu 
Γy in Figure 8).
As an example of another way of how a granular partition can be refined consider a
granular partitionΓUS which recognizes the Federal States of the US and letΓUS−EU
represent a granular partition which recognizes the Federal States of the US as well as
the states of the European Community together with a root cell labeled ‘The United
States and the States of the EU’. It is easy to see that we haveΓUS  ΓUS−EU .
This is an example of what we will callextensions. When one partition is an ex-
tension of another, then the target of the original root cell is always a proper part of the
extension’s root cell.
AssumeΓ1  Γ2 and consider the corresponding commutative diagrams in Figure
5. As sketched above, we can further analyze the two different uses of refinement by
considering the projection of those cells inZ2 which are not targeted by the mapping
f . Intuitively, in the case of proper refinement those cells project onto objects in∆2
which are parts of objects in the image ofρ1. In the case of extension, those cells
project onto objects in∆2 which are not parts of objects in the image ofρ1. Formally
we define now define the binary relationsRP (x is-properly-refined-byy) andEP (x
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is-properly-extended-by) which both are subrelations of as follows:
RP (Γ1,Γ2) ≡ Γ1  Γ2 and∀z2 ∈ Z2(∃z1 ∈ Z1(ρ2(z2) ≤ ρ1(z1))),
EP (Γ1,Γ2) ≡ Γ1  Γ2 and∀z2 ∈ Z2¬(∃z1 ∈ Z1(ρ2(z2) ≤ ρ1(z1))).
Obviously, there are also ‘mixed’ cases whereΓ1  Γ2 but neitherRP (Γ1,Γ2) nor
EP (Γ1,Γ2).
4.3 Counterparts
Consider the granular partitionsΓx, Γy, Γz, andΓu in Figures 7 and 8. Each of these
partitions has a cell labeled ‘Fred’s body’ of typehuman bodywhich projects onto
Fred’s body. (Similarly, each of these partitions has a cell labeled ‘Fred’s right arm’ of
type right human armwhich projects onto Fred’s right arm.) Notice that that the cell
labeled ‘Fred’s body’ in partitionΓx is distinct from the cell labeled ‘Fred’s body’ in
partitionΓy (which in turn is distinct from the cell labeled ‘Fred’s body’ in partitions
Γz andΓu). We call cells like the cells labeled ‘Fred’s body’ inΓx, Γy, Γz, andΓu
counterparts.
Let Γ1 = (Z1,∆1, ρ1,Λ1, φ1,Ω1, ψ1) andΓ2 = (Z2,∆2, ρ2,Λ2, φ2,Ω2, ψ2) be
labeled, typed granular partitions inP. The cellsz1 ∈ Z1 andz2 ∈ Z2 are counterparts,
z1 C z2, if and only if there is a target-, label-, and type-preserving one-one mapping
f : Z1 → Z2 such thatf(z1) = z2. Counterparthood is reflexive, symmetric, and
transitive, i.e., an equivalence relation:
ref C is reflexive since the identity mapping of the cell structure of a partition onto
itself is a target-, label-, and type-preserving one-one mapping;
sym C is symmetric since the inverse mapping (f−1) of every target-, label-, and type-
preserving one-one mapping (f ) between the cell structures of two partitions is
a (possibly partial) target-, label-, and type-preserving one-one mapping. Hence
if f(z1) = z2 thenf−1(z2) = z1.
trans C is transitive since the composition of two target-, label-, and type-preserving
one-one mappings is a target-, label-, and type-preserving one-one mapping.
It immediately follows that if partitionΓ1 is a refinement of partitionΓ2 then every cell
in Γ1 has a counterpart inΓ2. It also follows that counterparts of partitions which stand
in the refinement relation have identical labels. These points can be verified easily in
Figures 7 and 8.
5 Partition logic
So far we discussed granular partitions from an ‘God’s eye perspective’. That is, we
discussed the projective relationship of granular partitions to reality and explored (or-
dering) relationships among granular partitions. In this section we develop a formal
language,L, of how we ‘see’ mereological structurethroughgranular partitions. InL
we can to formally express the following statements relative to the collection of typed,
labeled granular partitionsΠ = {Γx,Γy,Γz,Γu} as depicted in Figures 7 and 8:
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A PartitionΓx recognizes that there exists an object named ‘Fred’s body’ of type
human body.
B Partition Γx recognizes that the object named ‘Fred’s body’ has an object
named ‘Fred’s right arm’ as a part.
C PartitionΓx and all its refinements inΠ recognize that the object named ‘Fred’s
body’ has an object named ‘Fred’s right arm’ as part.
D Some refinement ofΓx in Π recognizes that the object named ‘Fred’s body’
has an object named ‘Fred’s left arm’ as a part.
E All partitions inΠ recognize that human bodies have right human arms as parts.
F PartitionΓx does not recognize an object named ‘Fred’s left hand’.
G An object named ‘Fred’s left hand’ is absent in partitionΓx.
We use a first order modal logic with identity to formally express statements like A-G.
In this language,L, we have the additional binary predicate ‘SC’ which is interpreted
as the subcell relation (v) and the unary existence predicate ‘E’. We also introduce
a binary predicateIO which holds between cellz and typet if and only if t is type
assigned toz (to be defined more precisely below).
In Lwe use the letterz with indexes to designate variablesz, z1, z2, . . .. We use the
letterc with indexes to designate object-constantsc, c1, c2, . . .. We use the lettert with
indexes to designate type-constantst, 1, t2, . . .. Atomic formulas ofL are of the form
‘E z’, ‘ E c’, ‘ SCz1z2’, ‘ SCc1z2’, ‘ SCz1c2’, ‘ SCc1c2’, ‘ z1 = z2’ . . . , ‘ IO zt’, ‘ IO ct’.
α andβ are complex formulas which are defined recursively as follows: Ifα, β ∈ L
then so are∼ α, α ∧ β, α ∨ β, α→ β, α↔ β, α, ♦α, (∃z)(α) and(x)(α).
5.1 Semantics
Let Π be a set of labeled, typed granular granular partitions. LetZ be the set of
all cells of granular partitions inΠ, i.e, Z =
⋃
{Z | (Z,∆, ρ,Λ, φ,Ω, ψ) ∈ Π}.
Let Λ be the set of all labels of cells of granular partitions inΠ, i.e, Λ =
⋃
{Λ |
(Z,∆, ρ,Λ, φ,Ω, ψ) ∈ Π}. Let T be the set of all types of cells of granular partitions
in Π, i.e, T =
⋃
{Ω | (Z,∆, ρ,Λ, φ,Ω, ψ) ∈ Π}. Let be the refinement ordering
among members ofΠ, and letC be the counterpart relation between cells inZ. A
partition framethen is a sixtuple
(Π,Z,Λ, T ,, C).
In the semantics ofL the granular partitions inΠ are treated as ‘worlds’ and is
treated as an accessibility relation between worlds in the sense of the standard possible
world semantics of modal logic [HC04]. Hence, the granular partitionΓ2 is accessible
from the granular partitionΓ1 if and only if Γ2 is a refinement ofΓ1. Notice that, since
distinct granular partitions do not have cells in common, every cellz ∈ Z exists in
exactly one world. Cellsz1, z2 ∈ Z are counterparts in David Lewis’ sense if and only
if z1 C z2 [Lew86]. Since the accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive and the
counterpart relationC is an equivalence relation, the modal logic underlyingL will be
of type S4.
The object-constantsc1, . . . , cn of L are the members ofΛ, i.e.,{c1, . . . , cn} = Λ.
The interpretation function for object-constants is a binary functionIo : Λ × Π → Z
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such thatIo(c,Γ) = φΓ(c), whereφΓ is the labeling function of partitionΓ. The type-
constantst1, . . . , tm of L are interpreted as the members ofT , i.e.,It is a total one-one
onto mapping such thatIt(t) ∈ T .
The variables inL range over the members ofZ. µ andν are functions which
assign members ofZ to the variablesz, z1, z2, . . . Let Γ ∈ Π be a labeled, typed
granular partition with cell treeZ in the partition frameF = (Π,Z,Λ, T ,, C), and
let vΓ be the subcell relation between cells inΓ and letψΓ be the function assigning
types to cells inΓ. Atomic formulas inL are interpreted inF as follows:
µ |=FΓ [E z] iff µ(z) ∈ ZΓ
µ |=FΓ [E c] iff Io(c,Γ) ∈ ZΓ
µ |=FΓ [IO zt] iff ψΓ(µ(z)) = It(t)
µ |=FΓ [IO ct] iff ψΓ(Io(c,Γ)) = It(t)
µ |=FΓ [SCz1z2] iff µ(z1) vΓ µ(z2)
µ |=FΓ [SCc1z2] iff φ(Io(c1,Γ)) vΓ µ(z2)
µ |=FΓ [SCzc] iff µ(z) vΓ φ(Io(c,Γ))
µ |=FΓ [SCcz] iff φ(Io(c,Γ)) vΓ µ(z)
(3)
Following [HC04] complex formulas ofL then are interpreted as follows:
µ |=FΓ [∼ α] iff µ 6|=FΓ [α]
µ |=FΓ [α ∧ β] iff µ |=FΓ [α] andµ |=FΓ [β]
µ |=FΓ [α ∨ β] iff µ |=FΓ [α] or µ |=FΓ [β]
µ |=FΓ [α→ β] iff if µ |=FΓ [α] thenµ |=FΓ [β]
µ |=FΓ [α↔ β] iff µ |=FΓ [α] → β andµ |=FΓ [β → α]
µ |=FΓ [(zi)α] iff ν |=FΓ [α] for everyν with ν(zj) = µ(zj) if j 6= i andν(zi) ∈ ZΓ
µ |=FΓ [(∃zi)α] iff ν |=FΓ [α] for someν with ν(zj) = µ(zj) if j 6= i andν(zi) ∈ ZΓ
µ |=FΓ [α] iff for all Γ1 ∈ Π : if Γ  Γ1 then there is someν such thatν |=FΓ1 [α] and
µ(z) C ν(z) andν(z) ∈ ZΓ1 for all variablesz in α
µ |=FΓ [♦α] iff for someΓ1 ∈ Π : Γ  Γ1 and there is someν such thatν |=FΓ1 [α] and
µ(z) C ν(z) andν(z) ∈ ZΓ1 for all variablesz in α
(4)
Notice that we employ an ‘actualist’ semantics in the sense that the evaluation of the
truth of quantified formulasα in partitionΓ is performed with respect to the cells ofΓ,
i.e., |=LΓ [(z)α] and|=LΓ [(∃z)α] are evaluated with respect to the cells inZΓ.
The well-formed formulaα is true in partitionΓ of frameF on the interpretation
Io andIt (i.e., the partitionΓ recognizes thatα), |=FΓ [α], if and only if there is an
assignmentµ of the variables ofL with members ofZ such thatµ |=FΓ [α] holds.α is
valid in frameF (α is recognized by all partitions of frameF), |=F [α], if and only if
µ |=FΓ [α] holds for everyΓ ∈ Π and every assignmentµ of variables ofL to members
of Z, under the interpretationsIo andIt. α is valid, |= α, if and only if α is valid in
every partition frameF under interpretationsIFo andIFt .
Consider the following example. LetΠe = {Γx,Γy,Γz,Γu} be as depicted in
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Figures 7 and 8. We then have
Λe = {‘Fred’s body’, ‘Fred’s right arm’, ‘Fred’s left arm’, ‘Fred’s upper body’}
Ze = {φx(‘Fred’s body’), φy(‘Fred’s body’), φz(‘Fred’s body’), φu(‘Fred’s body’),
φx(‘Fred’s right arm’), φy(‘Fred’s right arm’), . . .}
Te = {human body, left human arm, right human arm,upper human body}
The counterpart relation holds between cells with identical labels and the refinement
relation holds as discussed above. The corresponding partition frame is
Fe = (Πe,Ze,Λe, Te,e, Ce).
Now assume that the object-constants ‘Fred’s body’, ‘Fred’s right arm’, . . . inL are
interpreted as the corresponding names inΛe and that type-constantsHumanBody,
RightHumanHand, . . . are interpreted as the corresponding types inTe. Given the se-
mantics ofL the sentences A-G can be now be expressed formally as follows:
A |=FeΓx [E ‘Fred’s body’ ∧ IO ‘Fred’s body’HumanBody]
B |=FeΓx [SC‘Fred’s right arm’ ‘Fred’s body’]
C |=FeΓx [(SC‘Fred’s right arm’ ‘Fred’s body’)]
D |=FeΓx [♦(SC‘Fred’s left arm’ ‘Fred’s body’)]
E |=Fe [[(z1)(Ez1 ∧ IO z1HumanBody→ (∃z2)(IO z2RightHumanArm∧ SCz2z1))]]
F |=FeΓx [∼ E ‘Fred’s left arm’ ]
G |=FeΓx [∼ E ‘Fred’s left arm’ ∧ ♦E ‘Fred’s left arm’]
Notice, that (A-G except E) are assertions about what is recognized by partitionΓx (or
it’s refinements). E is an assertion of what is true in (recognized by) all partitions in
the frameFe. Notice also, that (E) is not true in every frame since there are surely
partitions in frames other thanFe which do recognize human beings which do not
have a right arm or which trace over (do not recognize) a particular right arm. Thus,
the partition frameFe can be considered as acontextand the evaluation of statements
of L with respect toFe as the evaluation of the truth of the statements (A-G) in the
contextFe. Consider sentence (F).|=FeΓx [∼ E ‘Fred’s left arm’] does NOT mean that
Fred’s left arm does not exist. It merely means thatΓx fails to recognize that an object
with the name ‘Fred’s left arm’ exists. (G) shows that inL the sentence ‘An object
named ‘Fred’s left hand’ is absent in partitionΓx’ means thatΓx does not recognize
the existence of an object named ‘Fred’s left hand’ but that some refinement ofΓx d es
recognize the existence of this object.
5.2 Valid principles
We now prove that the following principles that are characteristic for a modal S4 pred-
icate logic are valid in any partition frame under the semantics given above:
K-S |= [(α→ β) → (α → β)]
T-S |= [α→ α]
4-S |= [α→ α]
D♦-S |= [♦α↔ ∼  ∼ α]
RN-S if |= [α] then |= [α]
BFC-S if |= [(z)α→ (z)α]
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K-S Assumeµ |=LΓ [(α→ β)]. Thus, if Γ  Γ1 then there is someν such that
ν |=FΓ1 [α→ β] andµ(z) C ν(z). AssumeΓ  Γ1. Then if there is someν such
that µ(z) C ν(z) and ν |=FΓ1 [α] then there is someν such thatµ(z) C ν(z) and
ν |=FΓ1 [β]. Thus ifµ |=
L
Γ [α] thenµ |=LΓ [β]. Henceµ |=LΓ [α→ β]. Thus
|= [(α→ β) → (α→ β)].
T-S Assumeµ |=LΓ [α]. Thus, ifΓ  Γ1 then there is someν such thatν |=FΓ1 [α]
andµ(z) C ν(z). Moreover, ifΓ  Γ1 thenν(z) = f(µ(z)). By reflexivity of 
we haveΓ  Γ. Thusν |=FΓ [α] andν(z) = id(µ(z)). Henceµ |=FΓ [α]. Thus
µ |=FΓ [α→ α].
4-S Assumeµ |=LΓ1 [α]. Thus ifΓ  Γ
′ then there is aν such thatν |=FΓ′ [α] and
µ(z) C ν(z) for all z in α and allΓ′. AssumeΓ1  Γ2 andΓ2  Γ3. Since is
transitive we haveΓ1  Γ3. Thus there is aν such thatν |=FΓ3 [α] andµ(z) C ν(z)
andν(z) = f23(f12(µ(z))) for all z in α, wheref12 : Z1 → Z2 andf23 : Z2 → Z3 are
label, target, type preserving total one-one mappings. Hence there is someι such that




andµ(z) C ι(z) for all z in α. Henceµ |=LΓ1 [α→ α].
D♦-S Assumeµ |=FΓ [¬¬α]. Iff µ 6|=FΓ [¬α]. Iff not for all Γ1: if Γ  Γ1 then
there is aν such thatν |=FΓ1 [¬α]. Iff not for all Γ1: if Γ  Γ1 then there is aν such




Iff µ |=FΓ [♦α].
RN-S Assume|= [α]. Then for allF and allΓ of F and assignmentsµ: µ |=LΓ [α].
AssumeΓ  Γ1. Then there is someν such thatν |=FΓ1 [α] andν(x) = f(µ(z))
for all z in α wheref : Z → Z1 is target, label, and type-preserving total one-one
mapping. Thus ifΓ  Γ1 then there is aν such thatν |=FΓ1 [α] andµ(z) C ν(z).
Henceµ |=LΓ [α]. Thus|= [α].
BFC-S Assumeµ |=LΓ [(zi)α]. Thus, if Γ  Γ1 then there is someν such that
ν |=FΓ1 [(zi)α] andµ(zi) C ν(zi). AssumeΓ  Γ1. Thus there is someν such that
ν |=FΓ1 [(zi)α] andµ(zi) C ν(zi). Sinceν |=
F
Γ1
[(zi)α] we haveι |=FΓ1 [α] for everyι
with ι(zi) ∈ ZΓ1 andι(zj) = ν(zj) if j 6= i. Let ι(zi) = ν(zi). SinceC is reflexive,
symmetric, and transitive we haveν(zi) C ι(zi) andµ(zi) C ι(zi). Thus, ifΓ  Γ1
then there is someι such thatι |=FΓ1 α andµ(z) C ι(z). Henceµ |=
L
Γ [α].
Let δ be such thatδ(zi) ∈ ZΓ andδ(zj) = µ(zj) if j 6= i. Thenδ |=LΓ [α] since
there is aι such thatι |=FΓ1 [α] with ι(zi) ∈ ZΓ1 andι(zj) = f(δ(zj)) for all zj ∈ ZΓ
wheref : ZΓ → Γ1 is a target, label, type, total one-one mapping which exists due to
Γ  Γ1. Thusµ |=LΓ [(zi)α].
We can also prove that if the formulaα that does not contain negation, universal
quantification, and implication is recognized by a given partitionΓ of frameF , thenα
is recognized by all refinements ofΓ of F :
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Theorem 1 If α 6= ¬β and α 6= (z)β and α 6= [β → γ] then if µ |=FΓ [α] then
µ |=FΓ [α].
Proof by induction over the complexity ofα. Assumeα = E c and letµ |=FΓ [E c].
ThenIo(c,Γ) ∈ ZΓ. AssumeΓ  Γ1 then there exists a total target, label, type, one-
one mappingf : ZΓ → ZΓ1 such thatf(Io(c,Γ)) = Io(c,Γ1). ThusIo(c,Γ1)) ∈ ZΓ1
andIo(c,Γ) C Io(c,Γ1). Hence ifΓ  Γ1 then there is aν such thatν |=FΓ1 [E c] and
µ(z) C ν(z). Thusµ |=FΓ [E c].
Assumeα = E z and letµ |=FΓ [E z]. Thenµ(c) ∈ ZΓ. AssumeΓ  Γ1 then
there exists a total target, label, type, one-one mappingf : ZΓ → ZΓ1 such that
f(µ(z)) ∈ ZΓ1 . Thus there is aν such thatν(z) ∈ ZΓ1 andµ(z) C ν(z). Thus
ν |=FΓ1 [E z] andµ(z) C ν(z). Henceµ |=
F
Γ [E z].
Assumeα = IO ct and letµ |=FΓ [IO ct]. ThenψΓ(Io(c,Γ)) = It(t). AssumeΓ 
Γ1 then there exists a total target, label, type, one-one mappingf : ZΓ → ZΓ1 such
that f(Io(c,Γ)) = Io(c,Γ1) andψΓ(Io(c,Γ1)) = ψΓ1(f(Io(c,Γ))). ThusIt(t) =
ψΓ1(f(Io(c,Γ))). ThusIt(t) = ψΓ1(Io(c,Γ1)). Hence ifΓ  Γ1 then there is aν
such thatν |=FΓ1 [IO ct] andµ(c) C ν(c). Thusµ |=
F
Γ [IO ct].
Assumeα = IO zt and letµ |=FΓ [IO zt]. ThenψΓ(µ(z)) = It(t). AssumeΓ  Γ1
then there exists a total target, label, type, one-one mappingf : ZΓ → ZΓ1 such that
f(µ(z)) ∈ ZΓ1 andψΓ(µ(z)) = ψΓ1(f(Io(µ(z))). Thus It(t) = ψΓ1(f(µ(z))).
Hence ifΓ  Γ1 then there is aν such thatIt(t) = ψΓ1(ν(z)) andµ(z) C ν(z). Thus
ν |=FΓ1 [IO zt] andµ(c) C ν(c). Thusµ |=
F
Γ [IO zt].
The treatment ofα = Eq z1z2, α = Eq cz, α = Eq zc, α = Eq cc, α = SCz1z2,
α = SCcz, α = SCzc, andα = SCcc is similar and omitted here.
Now assume that ifµ |=FΓ [β] thenµ |=FΓ [β] for all β, µ andΓ (IA).
Let α = β and assumeµ |=FΓ [β]. Then ifΓ  Γ1 then there is aν such that
ν |=FΓ [β] andµ(z) C ν(z) for all variablesz of β. SupposeΓ  Γ1. Thus, by IA,
ν |=FΓ1 [β]. Thus, ifΓ  Γ1 then there is aν such thatν |=
F
Γ1
[β] andµ(z) C ν(z)
for all variablesz of β. Henceµ |=FΓ [β].
Let α = ♦β and assumeµ |=FΓ [♦β]. Then for someΓ1 ∈ Π such thatΓ  Γ1
there is someν such thatν |=FΓ1 [β] andµ(z) C ν(z) for all variablesz in β. Thus, by
IA, ν |=FΓ1 [β]. Thus ifΓ1  Γ2 then there is aι such thatι |=
F
Γ2
[β] andν(z) C ι(z)
for all variablesz in β. By the reflexivity of we haveΓ1  Γ1 and there is aι such




Γ  Γ1. Then there is someν such thatν |=FΓ1 [♦β] and andµ(z) C ν(z) for all
variablesz in β. Thusµ |=FΓ [♦β].
Let α = (∃z)β and assumeµ |=FΓ [(∃z)β]. Thenν |=FΓ β for someν with
ν(zj) = µ(zj) if j 6= i andν(zi) ∈ Z. Thusν |=FΓ [β] by (IA). Hence ifΓ  Γ1
then there is aι such thatι |=FΓ1 [β] andν(z) C ι(z) for all z in β. AssumeΓ  Γ1.




for someι with ι(zj) = ι(zj) if j 6= i and ι(zi) ∈ Z. Henceι |=FΓ1 [♦β]. Thus
µ |=FΓ [♦β].
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From theorem 1 it follows that the following formulas are valid in partition frames:
S1 |= [(z1)(z2)(SCz1z2 → SCz1z2)]
S2 |= [(z1)(z2)(z1 = z2 → (z1 = z2))]
S3 |= [(z)(IO zt→ IO zt)]
That is, if partitionΓ recognizes that cellµ(z1) is a subcell ofµ(z2) then all refinements
of Γ recognize that their counterparts ofµ(z1) are subcells of their counterparts of
µ(z2) (S1). Similarly, for= (S2) andIO (S3).
That the following mereological principles are valid in any partition frame follows
immediately from the properties of the subcell relationv as specified in Section 2 and
the validity of RN-S:
M1-S |= [(z)(SCzz)]
M2-S |= [(z1)(z2)(SCz1z2 ∧ SCz2z1 → z2 = z1)]
M3-S |= [(z1)(z2)(z3)(SCz1z2 ∧ SCz2z3 → SCz1z3)]
M4-S |= [(z1)(z2)[(∃z3)(SCz3z1 ∧ SCz3z2) → (SCz1z2 ∨ SCz2z1)]]
Consider M1-S, assignmentµ and partitionΓ. We haveµ |=FΓ [(z)(SCz)] since what-
ever member ofZΓ the functionµ assigns to the variablez (µ(z) ∈ ZΓ by Equation 4) it
holds thatµ(z) vΓ µ(z) due to the reflexivity ofvΓ. Since ifΓ  Γ1 there is an order-
preserving total one-one mappingf1 : ZΓ → ZΓ1 such thatf1(µ(z)) vΓ1 f1(µ(z)).
Henceµ |=FΓ [(z)(SCz)] for anyµ, Γ, andF .
5.3 The theory
LetL the language of our partition logic with the semantics given above. We add toL
axioms sufficient for a first order logic with identity. We define the possibility operator
♦ as usual (D♦), add the S4-axioms T, 4, and K, and include the additional rule of
inference (RN).
D♦ ♦α ≡ ¬¬α
T α→ α
4 α→ α





Id (z1)(z2)(z1 = z2 → z1 = z2
We can prove that if all refinementsΓ1 of Γ recognize that for allz ∈ ZΓ1 it holds
thatα then for allz ∈ Γ it holds that all refinements ofΓ recognize thatα, i.e., we
can prove the converse of the so-called Bacon formula (BFC). We can also prove that
if z1 is identical toz2 in some partitionΓ then the counterpart ofz1 is identical to the
counterpart ofz2 in all refinements ofΓ (Id).
We then include axioms of reflexivity, asymmetry, and transitivity forSCas well as
an axiom for the no-partial overlap principle:
A1 (z)(SCzz)
A2 (z1)(z2)(SCz1z2 ∧ SCz2z1 → z1 = z2
A3 (z1)(z2)(z3)(SCz1z2 ∧ SCz2z3 → SCz1z3
A4 (∃z)(SCzz1 ∧ SCzz2) → (SCz1z2 ∨ SCz2z1)
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Using RN we can immediately derive:
T1 (z)SCzz
T2 (z1)(z2)(SCz1z2 ∧ SCz2z1 → z1 = z2)
T3 (z1)(z2)(z3)(SCz1z2 ∧ SCz2z3 → SCz1z3)
T4 [(∃z)(SCzz1 ∧ SCzz2) → (SCz1z2 ∨ SCz2z1)]
Corresponding to (S1) and (S3) we require: ifz1 is a subcell ofz2 in some partition
Γ then the counterpart ofz1 is a subcell of the counterpart ofz2 in all refinements of
Γ (A5); if z of type t in some partitionΓ then the counterpart ofz is of typet in all
refinements ofΓ (A6).
A5 (z1)(z2)(SCz1z2 → SCz1z2)
A6 (z)(t)(IO zt→ IO zt)
It is easy to see that the axioms T, K, and 4 as well as definitionD♦ and theorems
BFC and Id are valid in partition frames in virtue of T-S, K-S, 4-S and D♦-S, BFC-S,
and S-2 respectively. TM1-4 are valid in partition frames in virtue of M1-S - M4-S.
Axioms A5 and A6 are valid in virtue of S1 and S3. Since RN preserves validity as we
proved in RN-S it follows that reasoning inL is sound with respect to the semantics
given above.
Within L we can, for example, define:z exists if and only ifz is a subcell of itself
(DE); z is absent in a given partitionΓ if and only if Γ does not recognize thatz exists
but some refinement ofΓ recognizes thatz exists (DA); z1 is an essential subcell ofz2
if and only if in all refinements of the partition which recognizesz2, the counterpart of
z1 is a subcell ofz2 (DEP).
DE E z ≡ SCzz
DA A z ≡ ♦E z ∧ ¬Ez
DEP EPz1z2 ≡ E z2 → (z1 v z2)
These notions are interesting and useful, particularly due to their partition-theoretic
interpretation. For example, our formal definitions of existence (or presence) and ab-
sence on their partition-theoretic interpretation are very close to the notions of presence
and absence medical doctors use to reason about the outcome of medical tests [?]. No-
tice also that although the syntactic structure ofDEP is quite similar to the standard
definition of essential parthood, its interpretation is quite different from the standard
interpretation of what is meant by ’essential part’. To further explore the expressive
and the reasoning power ofL, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we continued our work on the formalization of granular partitions which
we started in [BS03]. We represented granular partitions as triples consisting of a
rooted tree structure as first component, a domain satisfying the axioms of Extensional
Mereology as second component, and a (projection) mapping of the first component
(the cell tree) into the second component (the target domain) as a third component. We
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then assigned labels and types to the cells of the cell tree such that if the cellz projects
onto the objectx in the target domain, then the label assigned toz is the name ofx and
the type assigned toz is the type ofx. The resulting structures are called labeled typed
granular partitions.
We defined an ordering (refinement) relation, among labeled typed granular par-
titions and a counterpart relation,C, which holds between cells in distinct granular
partitions that project onto the same object in reality. We proved that is reflexive and
transitive and thatC is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. Partition frames are struc-
tures formed by a set of labeled typed granular partitions, refinement relations between
the partition in this set, and counterpart relations among cells of the granular partitions.
We then introduced the formal languageL in which we can express sentences like:
‘PartitionΓx recognizes that there exists an object named ‘Fred’s body’ of type human
body’, ‘All partitions in contextΠ recognize that human bodies have right human arms
as parts’, ‘PartitionΓx does not recognize an object named ‘Fred’s left hand’ ’, ‘An
object named ‘Fred’s left hand’ is absent in partitionΓx’.
We gave a formal semantics ofL with respect to the interpretation in partition
frames, provided a formal system forL that facilitates formal reasoning, and showed
that reasoning within this system is sound with respect to the given semantics.
Important properties of the formal system are:
• L is not interpreted directly in reality but in cell structures of granular partitions
that have a projective relationship to reality;
• L is a modal predicate logic of type S4;
• granular partitions are treated as worlds in the sense of the standard multiple
world semantics of modal logic and the refinement relation between between
granular partitions is treated as an accessibility relation between worlds;
• the underlying semantics is an ’actualist’ semantics in the sense that quantifi-
cation is restricted to the cells of the granular partition with respect to which a
quantified formula is evaluated;
• since distinct granular partitions do not share cells we establish counterpart re-
lations between cells in distinct granular partitions that project onto the same
object in reality;
• the negation inL is rather weak:∼ α means that a given partition does not
recognize thatα is the case;
• in L we can express facts about the absence of certain objects and relations be-
tween them.
To further explore the expressive and reasoning power ofL and to firmly show
its usefulness in practical applications such as bio-medicine or geographic information
science is subject of ongoing research.
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